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The King, The JunTa and The “imparTial BroKer”: 
a microscopic approach To The Johnson-consTanTine 
meeTing on 11 sepTemBer 1967
Leonidas Kallivretakis
aBsTracT: This article explores the relations between the greek military regime and King 
constantine, as they evolved during the first months after the april 1967 coup, focusing 
on the part played by the “american factor”. Tracing step-by-step constantine’s contacts 
with us officials, from his conversations with the american ambassador in athens to his 
meeting with president Johnson, the author investigates the King’s perception of the us 
government’s position regarding a possible confrontation between him and the colonels 
and how that perception influenced constantine’s final decision to launch a counter-coup 
in december 1967.
on a warm athenian afternoon in september 1964, King constantine of 
greece invited to his palace the american ambassador henry labouisse.1 “The 
conversation was friendly and intimate,” recalls the ambassador, when suddenly 
“the King asked smilingly whether i wanted him to get rid of papandreou”. When 
labouisse asked him “whether he could if he wanted to”, constantine replied 
that “he could not do so now”.2
it is important to understand that, at this time, there was no visible sign of 
conflict between the 24-year-old King and george papandreou, the 76-year-old 
prime minister, whose accession to the premiership (after winning the February 
1964 elections with a landslide majority)3 coincided with constantine’s accession 
to the throne, following the death of his father, King paul, in early march.4 
1 henry r. labouisse (1904-1987) served as us ambassador to greece from 1962 to 1965.
2 Telegram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 4 september 
1964, 3 p.m., in James edward miller (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, 
Vol. 16, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey [hereafter FRUS, 1964-1968], Washington: united states 
government printing office, 2000, document 153.
3  richard clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy, durham: duke 
university press, 1987, pp. 48-49; cf. david Binder “papandreou party Wins in greece”, The 
New York Times, 17 February 1964.
4 “statement by the president on the death of King paul of greece, 6 march 1964”, Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, vol. 1, Washington: 
gpo, 1965, p. 337; cf. “greek King dead”, The New York Times, 7 march 1964.
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on the contrary, many people saw in this 
coincidence an opportunity for a fresh start 
in the relations between the conservative 
palace and the centre union party, which 
had a chance to apply its mildly liberal 
programme for the first time, after ten years 
of successive right-wing governments.5 
papandreou proceeded very cautiously 
from the start,6 even allowing the King to 
impose a favourite, petros garoufalias, as 
minister for defence and general ioannis 
gennimatas as army chief-of-staff,7 in 
order to avoid alarming the “establishment” 
(κατεστημένο, a word that his us-educated 
son andreas papandreou introduced into 
the greek political vocabulary).8 Therefore, 
the “friendly” chat in the royal palace that 
autumn afternoon of 1964 is an indication that even the slightest concession of 
power from the throne to the elected government was inconceivable from the 
very start.
This subject would occasionally surface in the conversations between the 
ambassador and the King, as in the one that took place on 27 January 1965, 
when constantine maintained that “some people” urged him “to act against the 
5 as george mylonas, minister for education, put it: “The fact that a young, new sovereign 
was taking office, a sportsman and an openhearted character, was considered a good omen. We 
would be able to start anew with the royal family, and […] might find a good modus vivendi 
with the new King. as things turned out perhaps it would have been better all round if King 
paul had lived.” see george mylonas, Escape from Amorgos, new York: scribner, 1974, p. 103.
6 in telegram 1261, sent from the us embassy in greece to the department of state on 19 
February 1964 (summarised in an editorial note in FRUS, 1964-1968, document 16), labouisse 
commented that the main characteristic of the new papandreou government was its “moderate 
nature”, noting that papandreou had placed conservatives in key positions.
7  michalis papakonstantinou, Η ταραγμένη εξαετία [The troubled six years], vol. 1, athens: 
proskinio, 1997, pp. 163-165.
8 see, for instance: “The establishment in greece is a joint venture between the royal circles, 
the foreign factor, the military cliques, the royalist and foreign-enslaved right-wing party, 
the organised monopolistic interests of big foreign companies and a few large greek firms – 
through networking spread in public administration, in banks and even through professional 
trade-unionists in labour organisations, in every part of our public life.” extract from one of 
andreas papandreou’s speeches, Μακεδονία (10 november 1966).
henry r. labouisse, us ambassador 
to greece, 1962-1965
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papandreou government”, but he did not consider such a move practicable, “at 
least at this time”, since papandreou “still had a strong popular appeal among the 
greek people”. at this point, labouisse observed that he “could well understand 
the importance of his being reasonably sure of success before taking on the prime 
minister” and that if he (that is, the King) “acted prematurely he could do the 
regime irreparable harm”.9
it is also important to note that, in January 1965, there was not even a hint on 
the horizon of the so-called “aspida conspiracy” and the alleged involvement 
of andreas papandreou, or of the heated correspondence between the King and 
the prime minister over the control of the ministry of defence, which eventually 
resulted in the resignation of the latter in July 1965 and subsequent political 
turmoil.10
Twenty-one months and five governments later,11 in april 1967, the 
situation, from the King’s viewpoint, had almost reached an impasse. even 
though the upcoming general elections, scheduled to take place on 28 may, 
9 airgram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 29 January 
1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 173.
10 aspida was a group of pro-centre and anti-right greek army officers, allegedly 
associated with andreas papandreou; although denied by the latter, the accusation was 
adopted by his political opponents, by the army high command and by King constantine 
himself, eventually resulting in the toppling of the centre union government in July 1965. 
For further reading, see Telegrams from the embassy in greece to the department of state, 
athens, 18 June 1965 and 5 september 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, documents 194 and 204; V. 
Kondratyev, “The ‘aspida affair’ and the reactionaries”, International Affairs 12 (1966), p. 
92; Keith Kyle, “plots and counterplots in King constantine’s greece: Behind the aspida 
Trial”, New Republic (21 January 1967); petros garoufalias, Ο “ΑΣΠΙΔΑ” και η πολιτική 
κρίση του Ιουλίου 1965 [“aspida” and the political crisis of July 1965], athens, 1977; aris 
Bouloukos, Υπόθεση ΑΣΠΙΔΑ [The aspida case], athens: Typos, 1989; James edward 
miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974, 
chapel hill: university of north carolina press, 2009, pp. 116-128, 145; stan draenos, 
Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick, london: iB 
Tauris, 2012, pp. 129-135.
11 These included three governments composed of centre union “apostates” or 
“renegades” (of which only the last managed to stay in power for 15 months, with the backing 
of the right-wing ere party), an interim government (supported by both centre union and 
ere, for the sole purpose of organising elections in may 1967) and finally an ere minority 
government, which dissolved parliament on 14 april 1967 and was charged with carrying 
out the above-mentioned elections, which never took place. For further reading, see “all 
the King’s men”, Time, 3 september 1965, p. 36; Jean meynaud, Rapport sur l’abolition de la 
démocratie en Grèce (15 juillet 1965-21 avril 1967), montreal, 1967; elias nikolakopoulos, Η 
καχεκτική δημοκρατία: Κόμματα και Εκλογές, 1946-1967 [The cachectic democracy: parties 
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had been called by the right-wing 
ere (minority) government, it 
was almost certain that the centre 
union party would win a majority in 
the new parliament, “undoubtedly” 
representing a majority of the 
population, which was becoming 
“increasingly frustrated, angry, 
anti-monarchical and probably 
anti-alliance”.12 under those 
circumstances, constantine had 
indicated his belief to the us 
ambassador, by then phillips 
Talbot,13 that “his throne and 
greece’s attachment to the West 
are at stake” and that he was facing 
a choice “of yielding his country to 
the papandreous or establishing a dictatorship either before or just after scheduled 
elections”. The King had sought a statement of us support for the imposition of 
dictatorship, but Talbot affirmed he had made clear to him that the american 
government could not give “such advance approval” and that he had “seriously 
warned” constantine of the dangers of “extra-constitutional action”.14
summing up the results of his recent contacts, Talbot informed the state 
department on 14 april that palace circles, the armed Forces and the ere 
were “evidently building up steam for ‘constitutional deviation’, meaning 
dictatorship”, the most probable scenario being that the “current ere 
government would be transformed into an emergency government with, initially, 
civilian ministers backed up by armed forces under orders of King”.15 The army 
and elections, 1946-1967], athens: pataki, 2001, pp. 350-371; miller, The United States and 
the Making of Modern Greece, pp. 122-133, draenos, Papandreou, pp. 261-287.
12 Telegram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 14 april 
1967, 0001Z, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 271.
13  William phillips Talbot (1915-2010) served as us ambassador from 1965 to 1969. 
Before that he served as assistant secretary of state for near eastern and south asian affairs 
(1961-1965) during the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations.
14 department of state, “greek political crisis”, 12 april 1967, national archives and 
records administration, Washington, d.c. (hereafter nara).
15 Telegram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 14 april 
1967. This analysis was common knowledge, as it is indicated in richard eder’s report from 
William phillips Talbot, us ambassador 
to greece, 1965 to 1969
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chief of staff, general grigorios spantidakis (another of the King’s favourites) 
was already setting the stage for a military intervention to take place under royal 
auspices.16 among those involved in the preparation of these plans were the 
members of a so-called “inner group” under the leadership of a soon-to-become-
famous officer, colonel georgios papadopoulos. Therefore, as the higher military 
commanders were about to make their final decision, papadopoulos’ “rightist 
military conspiratorial group” (as it was referred to in cia reports)17 took action, 
literally “stealing the thunder” from the generals and carrying out a coup d’état 
on 21 april 1967.18
Far from offering a full analysis of the political and social circumstances 
that led to the military dictatorship,19 the above narrative serves only as an 
athens, that same day: “What is widely feared here is that the King may become convinced 
by his advisers that there is no other way to preserve the monarchy except to prevent a centre 
union victory. This argument becomes, in effect, a plea for suspending the constitution and 
establishing a dictatorship” (The New York Times, 15 april 1967, reproduced also by the 
athenian newspaper Ελευθερία, 16 april 1967); cf. “it is the King, however, who has wedged 
himself into a political corner, where the only option to the return of a papandreou government 
may be an army-backed dictatorship. This is not an acceptable option and constantine must 
know it” (The New York Times, 17 april 1967, reproduced again by Ελευθερία, 18 april 1967).
16  central intelligence agency, secret intelligence information cable, athens, 9 march 
1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 260.
17  see Field information reports, 7 march 1966 and 20 december 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, 
documents 225 and 245.
18 charilaos lagoudakis, “The april coup”, p. 25; howard gotlieb archival research 
centre, Boston university.
19 For a detailed analysis and broader perspective of that period, see richard clogg and 
george Yannopoulos (eds), Greece Under Military Rule, london: secker and Warburg, 1972; 
John a. Katris, Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power, st. louis: new critics press, 
King constantine considered establishing a dictatorship “either before or just after 
scheduled elections” (us embassy Telegram from athens, 14 april 1967)
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introduction, intended to summarise, in vivid way, the King’s mentality and 
conception of his role as a constitutional monarch before the 21 april coup, 
thus contextualising his reaction after the coup, with particular regard to his 
perception of the part that the american “factor” played (or should have played) 
at that juncture.
constantine’s immediate reaction to the coup is well documented. caught 
unawares,20 as was most of the political and military leadership,21 besieged by the 
troops and armoured units of the conspirators, first at his Tatoi country palace 
and then at the ministry of defence, after some hesitation and back and forth, 
he gave way, accepting the appointment of the first dictatorial government, in 
which he managed to include some non-military royalist personalities. 
later that evening, the american ambassador found the King “blazingly 
angry”, shouting about those “incredibly stupid ultra-rightwing bastards” who, 
“having gained control of tanks, have brought disaster to greece”. unsure of what 
the following days or even hours would bring, constantine asked Talbot “how 
long it would take helicopters to reach Tatoi to evacuate his family if needed” and 
1971; nikos alivizatos: Οι πολιτικοί θεσμοί σε κρίση: Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπειρίας [political 
institutions in crisis: aspects of the greek experience], athens: Themelio, 1983; christopher 
m. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, london: granada, 1985; dimitris 
charalambis, Στρατός και πολιτική εξουσία: Η δομή της εξουσίας στη μετεμφυλιακή Ελλάδα 
[army and political power: the structure of power in post-civil war greece], athens; exandas, 
1985; alexis papachelas, O βιασμός της ελληνικής δημοκρατίας - Ο αμερικανικός παράγων 
(1947-67) [The rape of greek democracy: the american factor (1947-67)], athens: estia, 
1997; nikolakopoulos, Η καχεκτική δημοκρατία; sotiris rizas, Η Ελληνική Πολιτική μετά 
τον Εμφύλιο Πόλεμο: Κοινοβουλευτισμός και Δικτατορία [greek politics after the civil war: 
parliamentarism and dictatorship], athens 2008; draenos, Papandreou.
20  during the first hours of the coup, at approximately 4.15 a.m., when the us defence 
attaché colonel oliver K. marshall managed to communicate with the King, who was isolated 
at Tatoi, the latter confessed that he had no idea of what was happening, adding: “They are 
headed this way for me. get word to sixth Fleet. get word to Washington and have them 
send your army in.” This request for american military intervention would become almost an 
obsession for constantine in the following days and months; see telegram 4746 from athens, 
21 april 1967, summarised in an editorial note in FRUS, 1964-1968, document 273; cf. miller, 
The United States and the Making of Modern Greece, p. 147.
21  on the night of the coup, 68 personalities were arrested, among whom were members 
of the government (including the right-wing prime minister panayotis Kanellopoulos), 
mps (including the papandreou father and son), and high-ranking military officers. That 
same night and on the following days, 8,270 more persons were arrested across the country; 
6,118 of them were later deported to the infamous Yaros concentration camp; see leonidas 
Kallivretakis, Πώς φτάσαμε στην 21η Απριλίου [how we got to 21 april], athens: efimerida 
ton syntakton, 2017, pp. 141-144.
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whether there was any possibility for us 
marines to land in greece “to help him 
and generals reassert their control over 
armed forces”.22 answering that same 
night, the state department estimated 
that it would take 36 hours for american 
helicopters to reach Tatoi following 
an evacuation request. however, 
Washington instructed the ambassador 
to disabuse the King “of any notion of a 
us military intervention”.23 
Four evenings later, the King 
appeared “under considerably less 
strain”, giving Talbot the impression 
that he was “moving rapidly to adjust 
his relations with coup government”, 
having “moderate expectations of 
gradually regaining leadership of 
army and government”. he gave the 
ambassador an account of his meeting 
with the coup instigators, asserting 
that he berated them once again “for 
having moved without his knowledge” and for broadcasting over the radio, on 
the morning of the coup, a phony royal decree declaring martial law that he had 
not signed and had no intention of subsequently signing. he then had pressed 
them “hard”, according to himself, on the need to demonstrate to greece’s allies 
that their goal was a “resumption of constitutional government”, by setting up a 
committee of experts to prepare a “revised constitution that would be subjected to 
national plebiscite, after which elections could be held”. Talbot commented at this 
point that “it would be easy to announce such a scheme, but who would believe 
it?” he added that the us government was “uncomfortable at having greek ally 
under military dictatorship”, pointing out that, given public and congressional 
opinion, it would be “extremely difficult” to deliver tanks and other military 
hardware to a regime “which has used american-made tanks to overthrow [an] 
established government”. Though he seemed to understand that argument, 
22  Telegram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 21 april 
1967, 2030Z, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 275.
23  Telegram 180319 to athens, 21 april 1967, summarised in an editorial note in FRUS, 
1964-1968, document 275.
“greece: The palace coup”: 
Time magazine’s front page (28 april 1967), 
indicates that public opinion presumed that 
the dictatorship established in greece 
was a royalist one
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constantine expressed his hope that the us government “would not get [into] 
such an inflexible position” that would make it difficult to change its stance if the 
regime demonstrated “its readiness to return to constitutional rule”.24
The following month, though, constantine once again raised the issue of an 
eventual confrontation with papadopoulos and his comrades, expecting that his 
official visits to various military units scheduled for June would give him “a chance 
to test the loyalty and discipline of units to which he might want to turn”. his idea 
was to get his family out of the country and then to go north, where he would 
“base himself with loyal units” and broadcast to the nation that he was advancing 
on athens “to reassert his command over the armed Forces and his headship 
of the nation”. he considered that the success of his plan would depend “very 
substantially” on american actions. he was certain that the mere presence of the 
sixth Fleet in the area would be enough to “turn the tide”, although, “should the 
need arise”, he was also hoping for a peaceful landing of us marines, “as in lebanon 
in 1958”.25 alarmed, the american ambassador immediately tried to discourage 
the King’s expectations of “any involvement” of us forces, pointing out that it was 
“a long time since 1958” and conditions were different. returning to the embassy, 
Talbot “urgently” requested instructions from the state department in order to 
handle any “further stages of development” of constantine’s extravagant ideas.26
during his successive tours in northern greece and the peloponnese, 
constantine was “highly pleased” with his military contacts, feeling that he 
had the support of the most important army commanders.27 Therefore, at a 
subsequent meeting on 30 July with the us ambassador (who had just returned 
from Washington), he once more raised the possibility that, ultimately, he might 
have to confront the colonels’ regime. he also referred to the contacts he had 
with generals and other persons and seemed “reasonably expectant” that he 
24 Telegram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 25 april 
1967, 2300Z, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 281.
25  he was referring to the us military intervention in lebanon in July 1958, mandated 
by president eisenhower, in support of the pro-Western regime of camille chamoun, 
endangered from subversive moves backed by syria and egypt, in association with the 
recent revolution in iraq; see agnes g. Korbani, U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958–1982: 
Presidential Decisionmaking, Westport: praeger, 1991; pierrick el gammal, Politique intérieure 
et politique extérieure au Liban de 1958 à 1961 de Camille Chamoun à Fouad Chehab, paris, 
1991; erika g. alin, The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis: American Intervention in 
the Middle East, lanham: university press of america, 1994.
26 letter from the ambassador to greece (phillips Talbot) to the country director for 
greece (daniel Brewster), athens, 26 may 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 292.
27  airgram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 19 June 1967, 
Johnson presidential library.
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could get adequate support to oust the Junta. he stated, however, that it was not 
his intention to precipitate action unless the us government “approved of his 
purposes”, although he did not ask, as he had done in the past, about prospects 
of counting on the presence or logistical assistance of the american fleet. Talbot 
sought to make it clear to him that the us should not be expected to participate 
in any governmental change and that such a decision could only be taken by 
the King himself. constantine said that he understood, but if it should become 
necessary for him to act, he would advise the us government in advance.28 at 
this point, he spoke about his plans for an informal visit to the us, expressing 
his hope for a private meeting with president Johnson to discuss “the cyprus 
issue and domestic developments in greece”.29 
constantine’s request sparked a brief exchange of bureaucratic crossfire in 
Washington, between secretary of state dean rusk and national security advisor 
Walt rostow, since there was already a plan to invite the King for a visit in the 
spring of 1968. rusk initially “thought it better to stick to that plan”, while rostow 
argued that a visit would be useful at any time, “since it would serve their purpose 
of strengthening the King’s efforts to return greece to democratic processes” and, 
as a response to the concerns about the military coup among “a large number of the 
congressional liberals”, it would be worth “hearing constantine’s side of the story”. 
rusk was finally convinced, and it was therefore recommended that the president 
should receive constantine in the White house “for a small working luncheon with 
no other ceremonies”.30 on 4 august, Johnson eventually approved the invitation.31
in order to justify his trip to america, constantine used a pretext, by joining 
sailing events32 on lake ontario (from 28 august to 3 september) coupled with an 
28 Telegram from the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 7 august 
1967, 1130Z, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 298.
29  constantine had been scheduled to make a goodwill tour of europe and canada. 
Following the april coup, the Western european portion of the tour was cancelled, therefore 
the King decided to utilise some of the days originally scheduled for europe to make an 
informal visit to the us and request a meeting with the president; see editorial note 2, in FRUS, 
1964-1968, document 300, with references to unpublished sources (including telegram 876 
from athens, 18 august 1967, department of state, central Files, pol 7 greece); cf. helen 
conispoliatis, Facing the Colonels: British and American Diplomacy towards the Colonels’ 
Junta in Greece, 1967-1970, phd diss., university of leicester, 2003, pp. 116-117 [available 
online: https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/4220/1/dX227703.pdf].
30 memoranda for the president by dean rusk (2 august 1967) and by Walter rostow (4 
august 1967), as cited by conispoliatis, Facing the Colonels, p. 117.
31 see above-mentioned editorial note 2, in FRUS, 1964-1968, document 300.
32 seven years earlier constantine, then aged 20, had won a gold medal in sailing at the 1960 
summer olympics, and since 1963 was a member of the international olympic committee. 
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official visit to canada, and by accepting an invitation to attend the america’s 
cup in newport, rhode island (8-12 september).33 
as far as the meeting with Johnson was concerned, which of course had to be 
disclosed, it was decided to delay making a public announcement on it for as long 
as possible.34 it was announced simultaneously by the White house spokesman 
in Washington and the office of the grand marshal of the court in athens 
almost at the last moment, on 23 
august,35 although the rumours 
concerning it had been circulating 
for some days.36
so, constantine left athens on 
Thursday, 24 august, accompanied 
by his wife, anne-marie, his sister 
irene, the grand marshal of the 
court, leonidas papagos, and other 
courtiers.37 The royal party stayed 
for three days in new York, where 
constantine met with the greek 
orthodox archbishop of america, 
iakovos, and visited un secretary-
see The Games of the XVII Olympiad: The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, vol. 2, 
rome: organising committee, 1960, pp. 979-986. 
33 leonidas papagos, Σημειώσεις 1967-1977 [notes, 1967-1977], athens: goulandri-horn 
Foundation, 1999, pp. 17, 22.
34 one of the reasons why us officials wanted to avoid any premature publicity on the 
King’s visit was “to preclude some of his colonels climbing on the plane and coming to lunch 
with him”. see memorandum for richard m. moose (special assistant to Walt rostow) by 
harold h. saunders (national security council expert for mideast), press guidance on King 
constantine’s visit, 14 august 1967, as presented by conispoliatis, Facing the Colonels, p. 117.
35 Το Βήμα (24 august 1967); Telegram 026580 from the department of state to the 
embassy in greece, 24 august 1967, as cited by conispoliatis, Facing the Colonels, pp. 117-118.
36 on 18 august, margaret papandreou wrote to professor george lianis that “sally is 
paying a visit to the states (official? unofficial?) and it is assumed that she will see heap Big 
chief […] in any case, could you call Walt […] and suggest that the president make a pitch for 
mike in the discussion?”; see margaret papandreou, Nightmare in Athens, englewood cliffs: 
prentice-hall, 1970, pp. 295-296. in margaret’s code, “sally” stood for the King and “mike” for 
andreas papandreou. “Walt” stands most probably for Walter heller, an economics adviser 
in the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations.
37 including the King’s general secretary stellios hourmouzios, his aide-de-camp air Force 
lt. col. d. papageorgiou, his master of ceremonies m. geroulanos and the maids of honour 
mary Karolou and efrosyni Koryzi; see Μακεδονία (26 august 1967).
“royal Junta no, The King must go”: 
demonstrators on new York’s First avenue 
denounce constantine’s visit to the un 
headquarters (25 august 1967)
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general u Thant, accompanied by the 
former head of his political bureau (and by 
then permanent representative of greece 
to the un), dimitrios Bitsios.38 
during that visit, the royal couple had 
a first bitter taste of what it was like to 
travel abroad representing (willingly or 
not) a country under dictatorial rule. as 
constantine and his escort arrived at the un 
headquarters, the actress melina mercouri 
(who had been recently stripped of her 
greek nationality for criticising the military 
regime)39 made an “uninvited” appearance, 
in a move that sent the protocol, security 
and press officials of the international 
organisation “into a tizzy”. she swept into 
the building carrying an envelope addressed to constantine, while a small group of 
demonstrators, gathered in the drizzle across First avenue (carrying signs such as 
“royal Junta no, The King must go” and “royal Junta, Your days are numbered”), 
cheered her on, chanting “We love melina”. embarrassed un officials tried to 
escort the “volatile actress” out of sight of the royal couple, finally managing to 
shunt her into an auditorium, where she dragged “at least half the press corps” 
from the official royal reception to an impromptu press conference denouncing 
the dictatorship and the King for his silence on the military takeover. next day 
she was in almost every newspaper, with 
one remarking “it was ‘never on Friday’ 
for melina mercouri at the united nations, 
but she managed to upstage the greek King 
and Queen” and so on.40
on sunday, 26 august, constantine 
departed for Toronto, where he participated 
in sailing races (finishing in eighth 
position). upon his arrival, a “boisterous” 
crowd of several thousand Toronto-based 
greeks gathered at Queen’s park, carrying 
38  Το Βήμα (24 august 1967), Μακεδονία (25-27 august 1967).
39  Τα Νέα (13 July 1967).
40 see, for instance, The New York Times, Arizona Republic, Des Moines Register and The 
Kingston Daily Freeman (26 august 1967).
actress melina mercouri gives a press 
conference at the un headquarters 
denouncing the dictatorship and King 
constantine (25 august 1967)
greece’s royal couple arrives 
at Toronto airport (26 august 1967)
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placards with messages such as “We are Freedom loving people”, “long live 
democracy”, “down with the dictatorship” and “monarchy must end in 
democracy’s Birth place”, singing the greek national anthem,41 denouncing 
constantine’s responsibilities for the coup d’état and demanding the release of 
political prisoners in greece,42 with special reference to mikis Theodorakis43 and 
41 The greek national anthem is based on a poem of revolutionary origins, named the 
“hymn to Freedom”, inspired by the greek War of independence.
42 see the local newspapers Toronto Star (“3,000 greek-canadians protest King’s visit”) 
and Globe and Mail (“greek rally protests King’s backing of junta”), 28 august 1967; cf. 
mina noula, Homeland Activism, Public Performance, and the Construction of Identity: An 
Examination of Greek Canadian Transnationalism, 1900s-1990s, phd diss., university of 
Toronto 2015, pp. 146-157. a faint reflection of those incidents can be detected in the Junta-
controlled greek press, mentioning how some greek-canadians warmly saluted Queen anne-
marie on the streets of Toronto, deploring at the same time the attitude of some local greeks, 
who were a “scanty minority”. see Μακεδονία, 31 august 1967.
43  mikis Theodorakis, the well-known composer, political activist and mp (for the united 
democratic left), escaped capture in the first days of the coup d’état, going underground and 
initiating the formation of one of the first resistance organisations, the patriotic Front. he was 
arrested on 21august 967; see The New York Times (26 august 1967), Τα Νέα (5 september 
1967), Το Βήμα (7 september 1967); cf. papandreou, Nightmare in Athens, p. 304; for an 
account of his contribution in the struggle against the dictatorship, see mikis Theodorakis, 
Journal of Resistance, new York: coward, mccann & geoghegan, 1973; cf. george logothetis, 
Mikis Theodorakis: The Greek Soul, athens: agyra, 2004, pp. 97-140.
“down with the dictatorship”: 
greek demonstrators at Toronto’s Queen’s park (26 august 1967)
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andreas papandreou.44 on 1 september, the protesters gathered again in front 
of the granite club, where the royal couple attended a dinner organised by the 
44 meanwhile in athens, the regime announced its decision to press charges of high 
treason against andreas papandreou and ten other people, charges that could result in a death 
sentence; see The Sunday Times (26 august 1967), Τα Νέα (30 august 1967); cf. papandreou, 
Nightmare in Athens, p. 299. on august 28, margaret papandreou wrote to stan sheinbaum 
that “the time is very ripe with the publishing of the indictment – and the presence of the 
sailing boy in the states”, and underlined that “a real slick publicity job” was needed at the 
time of the king’s visit, “with the kind of timing that melina [mercouri] pulled at the un”; 
ibid., p. 300. The “publicity job” she was referring to, eventually erupted on 6 september, when 
most newspapers printed the declaration of two greeks that they were forced by the greek 
secret police to give “perjured testimony” against andreas papandreou; see The Washington 
Post and The New York Times (6 september 1967), Salt Lake Tribune (7 september 1967) 
and Somerset Daily American (11 september 1967); cf. papandreou, Nightmare in Athens, 
pp. 301-302; a special detailed article appeared later in Ramparts magazine (october 1967).
“King Konstantine (sic) is responsible for the greek Tragedy”: 
protesters in front of Toronto’s granite club (1 september 1967)
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local official greek community association. constantine’s arrival spurred “a wave 
of boos” by the demonstrators, who carried signs such as “King Konstantine is 
responsible for the greek Tragedy” and “Junta’s King refused our petition for 
democracy in greece”.45 
The following saturday, 2 september, constantine travelled to ottawa, starting 
his official visit to canada, which he completed five days later in montreal, where 
he visited expo 67. on this occasion too, several thousand greeks residing in the 
Quebec capital demonstrated in front of château champlain, protesting at “the 
visit of King constantine to the montreal World’s Fair”, while a smaller group came 
to “salute the sovereign”.46 eventually, the royal party departed from Quebec on 
saturday,  9 september, flying to newport, rhode island.47
meanwhile, in view of Johnson’s forthcoming meeting with constantine, 
rusk prepared, on 7 september, a memorandum for the president, including 
recommended answers to the issues that the King was likely to raise.48 
starting from the assessment that constantine believed that his role was to 
be “continuously pressing the coup leaders in the direction of a return to 
democratic processes” and that he would seek “presidential assurances” 
of us backing in an eventual confrontation he might have with the Junta, 
rusk recommended that, although the King’s effort to return “the country to 
constitutionalism” should be appreciated, he should be discouraged at the same 
time from “pushing the regime to the point of provoking a confrontation”, since 
45 see Toronto Star and Globe and Mail (2 september 1967); cf. noula, Homeland Activism, 
pp. 157-161; according to the latter, “some of the dinner guests confronted the protesters and 
a fight broke out” (ibid., p. 158).
46  according to the local newspapers, “près de 4.000 membres de la communauté 
grecque” participated in that demonstration and “presque tout l’état major de la police 
de montréal était sur les lieux. on estime que même à l’occasion de la visite de charles 
de gaulle, la police n’avait mis sur pied un dispositif de sécurité aussi important”; see 
Le Devoir (7 september 1967). The comparison of police mobilisation refers to charles 
de gaulle’s visit to expo 67, a few weeks earlier, where the French president uttered the 
famous phrase “Vive le Québec libre!” (a slogan used by French canadians who favoured 
Quebec’s independence from canada), provoking thus a serious diplomatic crisis between 
the French and canadian governments, which resulted in de gaulle interrupting his official 
visit and returning to France on a French military jet; see The Toronto Daily Star (26 July 
1967) and The Globe and Mail (27 July 1967); cf. dale c. Thomson, Vive le Québec libre, 
Toronto: deneau, 1988.
47 detailed reports on the royal tour were published in most greek newspapers; see, for 
example, Μακεδονία (24 august-9 september 1967).
48 memorandum from secretary of state rusk to president Johnson, Washington, 7 
september 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 300.
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the us did “not want to see armed conflict in greece” and would not intervene 
“militarily in his behalf”. There was also reference to constantine’s belief that 
his position vis-à-vis the Junta would be enhanced by the resumption of us 
military aid to greece. in this respect, rusk suggested that the King should be 
informed that full resumption of military aid was at that moment out of the 
question, because of strong public and congressional opposition. however, the 
possibility of releasing a few of the items then currently suspended could be 
considered, thus bolstering the King’s position vis-à-vis the coup leaders and 
preventing, at the same time, us relations with greece from “becoming frozen”. 
This memorandum foreshadowed the context within which the crucial meeting 
at the White house, four days later, would take place. 
on that same day, though, there was still another memorandum, of very 
different content, also trying to make its way to Johnson’s desk. stephen 
rousseas, a greek-american economist,49 was in copenhagen on september 
7, meeting the social democratic danish prime minister, Jens otto Krag, to 
whom he delivered a message secretly 
smuggled out of athens by margaret 
papandreou, based on her captive husband’s 
instructions, requesting its delivery to 
Johnson “before his scheduled meeting 
with King constantine”. This message 
presented andreas papandreou’s positions 
on an exit from the dictatorship. in order 
to have “parliamentary democracy restored 
to greece at the earliest possible moment”, 
papandreou agreed to the need for a 
“transitional national unity government”, 
whose mission might last from “eight 
months to a year”, before any elections were 
held. he furthermore explicitly underlined 
that he had “no intention of challenging 
the King’s constitutional role” in the 
future and that he was “fully in favor of the 
49 For a detailed account of stephen W. rousseas’ implication in greek politics, his 
relationship with andreas papandreou and the struggle against the Junta during the 
first year of the dictatorship, see his The Death of a Democracy: Greece and the American 
Conscience, new York: grove, 1967, as well as his article “memoire on the ‘second’ 
solution”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 2/1 (1975), pp. 22-35; cf. draenos, Papandreou, 
pp. 270-274, 285, 291.
greek-american economist 
stephen rousseas delivered andreas 
papandreou’s positions on an exit 
from the dictatorship to danish 
prime minister Jens otto Krag
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continuation of greece as a crowned democracy”, as well as “an integral part 
of the naTo alliance”. his only conditions were that “all political prisoners” 
would have to be “released”, that “none of the former political prisoners” 
would be “denied their civil and political rights” and that all would be “free to 
participate in the post-coup political life of greece”. 
at Krag’s request, the following day rousseas prepared a brief, one-
page memorandum summarising the above positions, which the danish 
prime minister forwarded in good time to Washington, through diplomatic 
channels.50 There is certain evidence that it was received by the assistant 
secretary of state for near eastern affairs, lucius Battle, “the day before King 
constantine saw the president”, before eventually reaching rostow.51 however, 
it is very doubtful that Johnson ever saw it.52 
The president received nevertheless another letter, this one addressed 
directly to him by margaret papandreou, in which she pointed out that her 
husband “has been charged with a crime he never committed; he is a political 
prisoner, not a criminal” and indicated that it was “within the King’s powers to 
give amnesty”, a gesture that “would be a decisive and popular act and would be 
the most potent proof of his intentions to lead the nation back to constitutional 
government, parliament and civil rights”. she pleaded with Johnson to “urge 
this course of action upon the King”. This letter was delivered to the White 
house on monday, 11 september, at 09:55,53 less than three hours before 
constantine’s arrival.
That same morning, indeed, the King, accompanied by papagos, flew to 
Washington, where he stayed all day, during which he visited the White house 
twice. his first visit, which lasted almost two hours (from 12:37 to 14:35), 
included a private meeting with president Johnson in the oval office for about 
50 see rousseas, Death of a Democracy, pp. 22-35.
51  see harold h. saunders, memorandum for WWr [Walter rostow], Washington, 1 
december 1967, Johnson presidential library.
52 although rousseas had insisted for the message to be delivered “directly” to Johnson 
and not through the state department, whose intentions he didn’t trust, obviously Krag found 
it difficult to bypass normal diplomatic protocol, instructing nevertheless his ambassador in 
Washington to request that the message be communicated to the president; see rousseas, 
Death of a Democracy, pp. 25-26.
53 in that same letter, margaret underlined also that andreas would abandon politics 
altogether, in order to return to his academic career; see margaret papandreou to president 
lyndon B. Johnson, athens, 3 september 1967, Johnson presidential library; cf. papandreou, 
Nightmare in Athens, pp. 304-305.
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half an hour (12:37–13:12), followed by a crowded luncheon.54 he then left at 
14:35 for congress and returned later to the White house, where he met once 
54 according to the White house official daily diary, in addition to Johnson and 
constantine, there were also present, from the american side, Vice-president hubert 
humphrey, secretary of state dean rusk, defense secretary robert mcnamara, presidential 
adviser Walt rostow and assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs lucius Battle 
and, from the greek side, the grand marshal of the court, leonidas papagos, and the chargé 
d’affaires of the greek embassy in Washington, alkiviadis papadopoulos. The names of the 
participants are also fully confirmed by the report of the athens news agency of that date, 
which was widely published in the greek press. in his notes, papagos mentions humphrey, 
rusk and mcnamara, adding curiously the american ambassador to athens, Talbot, who was 
unlikely to have been present as no other source confirms this; the fact that he mentions him as 
“Battler Talbot” suggests a confusion with assistant secretary of state Battle. equally curious 
is the information in the White house daily diary that, before the luncheon, constantine 
received a call from his mother, “from Zurich”, to whom Johnson also spoke briefly. however, 
other sources do not mention a foreign trip by Frederika in that period; see The White house, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Daily Diary, lBJ library; cf. Το Βήμα and Μακεδονία (12 
september 1967); papagos, Σημειώσεις, p. 19.
“president Johnson greets King constantine of greece at the White house” 
(upi telephoto, 11 september 1967)
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again with Johnson, in the presence of rusk and rostow. This second meeting 
lasted a little over an hour (17:12–18:17), but after Johnson left at 17:45, due to 
other obligations, constantine continued the discussion with his two remaining 
interlocutors.55
it is uncertain if, during his second visit in the White house that day, 
constantine was aware of a small group of about one hundred people gathered 
across the street, including once again melina mercouri. The demonstrators carried 
signs such as “melina mercouri is a greek”, shouted “down With The Fascist King” 
and “The King must go” and tried to get closer to the presidential residence, but 
were stopped by the police. speaking to the reporters that hastened to the scene, the 
greek actress called on Johnson not to provide any military aid to the dictatorial 
regime. “Freedom is all we need,” she said.56
For the content of the discussions the King held in Washington, our main 
source is the official us memorandum, which is probably incomplete, since it was 
based on the “recollections” of rostow, who was not present for the King’s first 
tête-à-tête with the president in the oval office.57 some details are also included 
in papagos’ narrative, published 32 years later (in 1999, yet before the american 
records became available in 2000); but his direct personal testimony is limited, 
since he was only present at the luncheon, although he includes some additional 
information, which obviously was given to him by the King.58 and, of course, there 
is constantine’s own narrative, which was published 48 years later (in 2015).59 in 
all these sources, some points are in agreement, while others are not.
according to the official us account,60 constantine expressed to Johnson 
his lack of confidence in the coup leaders’ ability to come up with “coherent 
government policies”, on the grounds that they lacked “the talents to govern”. 
he insisted in particular on his devotion to the concept of returning 
greece to “constitutional procedures and democratic processes”, stating that 
55 The hours mentioned here come from the official daily diary of the White house and are 
confirmed, to some extent, by the reports of the athens news agency; see The White house, 
Johnson’s Daily Diary; cf. Μακεδονία (12-13 september 1967).
56  see, for instance, the newspapers The Washington Post, Detroit Free Press and Lowell 
Sun (12 september 1967); cf. the united press international telegram, as reported by the swiss 
newspaper L’Impartial, that same day.
57 memorandum of meeting between president Johnson and King constantine, 
Washington, 11 september 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 301.
58 papagos, Σημειώσεις, pp. 19-22.
59 georgios p. malouchos (ed.), Βασιλεύς Κωνσταντίνος χωρίς τίτλο [King constantine 
without a title], vol. 2, athens: pelasgos, 2015, pp. 277-287.
60 any differences or additions in comparison with other sources will be noted.
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he intended to get his family out of greece if tensions between him and the 
coup leaders increased. moreover, he would not hesitate to put his life at risk 
if the confrontation became unavoidable. he noted that on these issues he had 
some support from military commanders in the north of the country, but he 
acknowledged that, as time went on, the coup leaders were infiltrating all army 
commands with officers of “absolute loyalty to them”.
he identified possible dates for his prospective confrontation with the Junta 
either in december 1967, when the committee’s report on a constitutional revision 
was to be reviewed by the coup leaders, or in 1968, at the time of the plebiscite on 
the new constitution. he did not, however, rule out confronting them on an earlier 
date if they attempted a “second round” in the showdown. however, he made it 
clear that, in any case, the confrontation would need to involve substantial issues 
and not questions, for example, like military appointments.61
he asked what the us would be prepared to do in the case of such a 
confrontation, raising the possibility of a landing of us marines as a show of 
force or the positioning of the sixth Fleet in greek waters. at a minimum, he 
expected an official us statement in support of his efforts to return the country to 
constitutional rule. Johnson, for his part, pointed out that a military intervention 
“would not be feasible”, whereas the question of a public statement would be 
considered in the light of the circumstances at the time, thereby avoiding making 
a commitment in advance.62 constantine also pointed out the need to be able 
to communicate “with his people” in the event of a confrontation. requesting 
the possible use of Voice of america radio transmitters (located in Thessaloniki 
and rhodes), he received no straight answer. 
61 in his own narrative, constantine affirms that he made it clear to the americans that he 
was “entirely against the Junta”, and that he intended to make a move. he avoided giving them 
an exact date, “because i did not trust them”; see malouchos, Βασιλεύς Κωνσταντίνος, p. 287.
62 constantine repeatedly argued that he never asked for military assistance, but only 
political and moral support, which Johnson promised him; see malouchos, Βασιλεύς 
Κωνσταντίνος, p. 286. in a discussion with henry Tasca in 1971, he insisted that, when he 
visited Washington in september 1967, “he made plain all he was seeking was moral support, 
since us force would have been unthinkable”; cf. Telegram from the embassy in greece to the 
department of state, athens, 11 July 1971, 0855Z, in James edward miller, douglas e. selvage, 
laurie Van hook (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume 29, Eastern 
Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972 [hereafter FRUS 1969-1972], Washington: gpo, 
2007, document 319. however, according to papagos’ description of the meetings, rusk told 
constantine that he should not expect “dynamic assistance” from usa and that “a bluff with 
the sixth Fleet can create an escalation that we do not want”, replies that suggest that these 
issues were raised by the latter; see papagos, Σημειώσεις, p. 21.
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he finally made a plea for the restoration of us military aid to greece, noting 
that the continued withholding of aid did not facilitate the achievement of us 
political goals and irritated the colonels, while its partial rehabilitation “linked 
to continued loyalty to the constitutional scenario” would be helpful. 
For his part, Johnson made it clear that he could not commit himself until 
legislation was passed but stated that he understood the King’s argument.63 The 
president also raised the political problems caused by the case of papandreou 
and the other political prisoners. constantine “explained the legal position” with 
papandreou,64 but did not seem to rule out the possibility of an amnesty, “once 
the legal procedures had been followed”.65
While there is still a degree of uncertainty as to the exact content of the 
confidential White house talks, what was said during the King’s visit to 
congress (which was also supposed to be confidential) quickly became public,66 
with direct negative effects on the image of constantine and with predictable 
consequences for his relations with the colonels. on capitol hill, the King met 
with members of the senate Foreign relations committee and other senators 
and congressmen.67although he was pelted with pressing questions “in an 
63 according to papagos’ recollection, Johnson stated that “as long as the current situation 
continues, there is nothing he can do”, while rusk said that a law was to be passed by congress 
in november and that, therefore, if there was clear evidence by then from the greek government 
that the new constitution would pass, aid would resume; see papagos, Σημειώσεις, p. 20.
64 see below his more detailed answer on this matter, later that day in congress.
65 constantine affirmed later that he raised with Johnson the case of ioannis Tsouderos, 
another greek who had also studied in the us, was also the son of a former prime minister 
and was also in jail, for whom no one spoke, as well as the case of thousands of others, and 
that “they all must get out”; see malouchos, Βασιλεύς Κωνσταντίνος, p. 284; cf. papagos, 
Σημειώσεις, p. 19.
66 according to constantine, Johnson had warned him with the words: “my boy, do not 
tell those bastards anything you would not want to read the next day in the newspapers”; see 
malouchos, Βασιλεύς Κωνσταντίνος, pp. 277-278; cf. papagos, Σημειώσεις, p. 21.
67 present were, among others, the committee chairman J. William Fulbright (d), senators 
edward Kennedy (d), george mcgovern (d), george aiken (r), Birch Bayh (d), J. caleb 
Boggs (r), edward Brooke (r), Frank carlson (r), Joseph clark (d), John cooper (r), everett 
dirksen (r), clifford hansen (r), Bourke hickenlooper (r), daniel inouye (d), Thomas 
Kuchel (r), eugene mccarthy (d), gale mcgee (d), Thomas mcintyre (d), Karl mundt 
(r), John sparkman (d) and stephen Young (d), as well as greek-american members of 
the house of representatives nick galifianakis and peter Kyros; see memorandum for the 
Files, Visit of King constantine: coffee hour with senate Foreign relations committee, 
11 september 1967, nara, rg 84, athens post Files: Frc 72 a 5030, pol 7 Visits, King 
constantine; cf. Arizona Republic and Μακεδονία (12 september 1967); for clarification of 
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constantine meets senators and congressmen in Washington 
(memorandum for the Files, us congress, 11 september 1967)
some of the names, see united states senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate: Millennium Edition, 1816-2000, Washington: gpo, 2000.
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electrified atmosphere”,68 he 
made a “good impression”, 
according to most sources, by 
fielding the questions in a “very 
direct and alert fashion”, and by 
“being very frank”.69
in his opening statement, 
constantine noted that, when 
the colonels took over on 21 
april, he had two options, that 
is, either to play a role of “passive 
resistance” or to be “more 
active”, and that he chose the latter, by pressing for “constitutional reform” and by 
bringing civilians into the government. he asked the senators show “patience and 
understanding” in dealing with the situation in greece in order to “avoid bloodshed”. 
asked about the timetable for constitutional reform, he described the various steps, 
acknowledging though that there was no “exact time limit”.70 regarding the military 
aid issue, constantine underlined the need to “keep up the defense of greece within 
the framework of naTo”. asked “to whom the united states arms would be used 
against”, he replied: “against the enemies of the united states.” 
in response to a question as to what he had done “personally” about the 
political prisoners, he affirmed that he “had urged” the government to either 
afford them a prompt trial or to release them and that, as a result, about 4,000 
prisoners (of the original 6,000 arrested) had been released. regarding, more 
specifically, the case of andreas papandreou, constantine stated that he 
68  papagos, Σημειώσεις, p. 21.
69 memorandum for the Files, Visit of King constantine, p. 1; cf.: “The senators said they 
were impressed with the young monarch’s plea for time and patience while he tries to revive 
constitutional democracy in greece,” The Indiana Gazette (13 september 1967); see also the 
particular statements of senators edward Kennedy (“the king recalled his pledge of a return to 
democracy”), Joseph clark, (who said the King was “frank”) and george aiken (“the monarch 
was frank and charming”), as published in the Arizona Republic (12 september 1967).
70 on this issue, the greek-american congressman peter Kyros noted that he was 
concerned about the genuineness of the intentions of the coup leaders as regards constitutional 
reform, because they kept referring to the fact that they had “a mission to accomplish” 
and a timetable could therefore not be set; see memorandum for the Files, Visit of King 
constantine, p. 2. peter nicholas Kyros (1925-2012), born in portland, maine, was the son of 
greek immigrants and a democratic representative to congress, from 1967 to 1975; he later 
served as a state department liaison to congress (1980-1982); cf. “peter n. Kyros, democratic 
congressman from maine, dies at 86”, The Washington Post (21 July 2012).
The greek-american democratic congressmen nick 
galifianakis (left) and peter Kyros (right) participated 
in questioning constantine on capitol hill
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remained in jail and would be going on trial, on 
“charges made by the public prosecutor prior 
to the april 21 coup”.71
he stated, once more, that he never 
signed the suspension of the articles of the 
constitution.72 When at one point a senator, 
John sparkman, began a question with the 
words “What is your government doing 
about”, constantine hastened to interrupt 
him, by declaring emphatically: “it’s not my 
government!” 
although constantine had made clear 
that the details of the meeting “should 
not be divulged”,73 the phrase “it’s not my 
government” was leaked the following day to 
most american newspapers and later worldwide (as one might expect), pointing 
out that the “King of greece” set himself apart from the “military junta that now 
71 This refers obviously to the request made to the greek parliament, on 24 February 1967, by 
the public prosecutor ch. moustakis and the judicial investigator s. sokratidis, for the lifting of the 
parliamentary immunity of andreas papandreou and pavlos Vardinoyannis, in order for them to 
be charged with eventual political responsibility in the aspida case; see Ελευθερία, 25 February 
1967. in reality, given that parliament did not have the opportunity to vote on that request, those 
charges were never officially pronounced “prior to the april 21 coup”, as constantine asserted. 
addressing congress, the King assured also his audience that, since 1965, papandreou kept “close 
contact with the extreme left”, angering even his father; see memorandum for the Files, Visit of 
King constantine, p. 2; reading the Washington Post reportage next day, that “as to andreas 
papandreou, the economist-son of a former prime minister, the King gave the impression that 
he felt the case against him was considerable”, margaret papandreou bitterly commented: “so 
the King had not yet understood that the threat against him and the monarchy came from the 
military clique which took over the government, not from the political personage of andreas 
papandreou”; see papandreou, Nightmare in Athens, p. 305.
72 Arizona Republic (12 september 1967).
73  While replying to a question asked by greek-american congressman nick galifianakis; 
see memorandum for the Files, Visit of King constantine, p. 3. nick galifianakis, born in 
durham, north carolina, was the son of greek immigrants and served as a democratic 
representative to congress, from 1967 to 1973. his nephew, also named nick galifianakis, 
draws satirical cartoons in The Washington Post, while another nephew is the well-known 
comedian Zach galifianakis; see north carolina secretary of state, North Carolina Manual, 
vol. 1967, p. 539; Spartanburg Herald Journal (4 June 1972); The New York Times (6 June 
2009); The Washington Post (20 august 2010).
democratic senator John 
sparkman’s question provoked 
constantine’s declaration:
“it’s not my government!”
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Walt rostow proposes leaking information to the press that the King raised the question of 
us resuming military aid to greece (memorandum for the president, 13 september 1967)
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governs his country”.74 papagos tried hard “to soften the impressions so as not 
to create an unbearable situation in relations with the government”, by making 
a series of contacts, while in collaboration with the chargé d’affaires of the greek 
embassy, alkiviadis papadopoulos, he sent a report to athens in an attempt to 
alter the image of “the senate events”.75 in order to counter the “unfortunate” 
leak, rostow asked Johnson’s permission to divulge that, during his discussions 
in the White house, “the King raised the question of our resuming military 
aid”, thus giving him the credit for at least raising the subject “closest to the 
junta’s heart”.76
The epilogue of the visit was – supposedly – written during the return flight 
to greece, in the early hours of Wednesday, 13 september. paul ioannidis (who 
was the captain of the olympic airways’ commercial flight that day but also 
the regular pilot of the King’s 
personal aircraft, a grumman 
gulfstream), affirmed that he 
received a message over the 
radio from Johnson, which 
he immediately delivered to 
constantine. according to 
the pilot’s recollection, the 
meaning of that message was 
“clear”, in the sense that “he 
[the president] urged him [the 
King] to overthrow the junta 
and restore democracy”.77 
74  The phrase became a headline in The Washington Post (12 september 1967) and similar 
circulated widely publications; cf., for example: “King constantine of greece yesterday set himself 
apart from the military junta which has ruled his nation since a coup last april”, Arizona Republic 
(12 september 1967); “King constantine of greece [...] disassociated himself from the actions of 
the military Junta now leading his country”, The Indiana Gazette (13 september 1967).
75 Frederika kept also calling Washington “very troubled”, but papagos has the impression 
that finally “the explanations given were accepted [from the Junta] without discomfort”; see 
papagos, Σημειώσεις, p. 22.
76  according to rostow, this suggestion was made by papagos, as well by senator claiborne 
pell, from rhode island, who had met constantine in newport the previous day; Johnson 
wrote on the document “if true it’s oK”, but this author has no evidence if that gesture was 
finally carried out; see memorandum for the president, “Further Backgrounding on King 
constantine”, Washington, 13 september 1967, Johnson presidential library.
77 Pavlos Ioannidis, Κι αν δεν είσαι, θα γίνεις [Even if you are not, you will become], Αthens: 
Livani, 2008, p. 149.
Besides president Johnson, secretary of state 
dean rusk (left) and national security adviser 
Walt rostow (right) were constantine’s main 
interlocutors at the White house
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constantine refers also to this incident, 
using slightly different words: “Johnson 
sent to the cockpit a most warm telegram, 
in which he wrote that i had his full 
solidarity for the effort we made against the 
junta.”78 This curious piece of information, 
mentioned for the first time by ioannidis 
40 years after and repeated by constantine 
seven years later, is not confirmed by any 
other source.79
The rest, as the saying goes, is history. 
The King finally launched his countercoup 
on 13 december 1967,80 roughly carrying 
out the plan he had already described to the 
american ambassador the previous may. 
he flew to northern greece, where he was 
received by some loyal military commanders 
and called on the Junta to cede power. his 
assumption that his “royal presence” among 
the troops would alone be enough and that 
78 malouchos, Βασιλεύς Κωνσταντίνος, p. 286.
79  not even by papagos, who was also on that flight, had an overall view of the issues at 
stake during the visit and, furthermore, he functioned de facto as constantine’s principal 
political advisor at that time.
80 early in the morning of 13 december, the Κing summoned Talbot to Tatoi palace and 
informed him that he had decided to move against Junta that very day. he said he would be 
grateful if the us could “endorse his move as step toward constitutional government” and “use 
all available persuasion to convince colonels it would be unwise for them to seek to oppose 
his action and thus thrust greece into civil war”. Finally, he repeated his request for us radio 
stations in greece to broadcast a taped statement in which he stated his decision “to bring about 
return to democratic normality”. The ambassador immediately informed the state department in 
Washington as well as dean rusk, who was in Brussels for a naTo meeting. he proposed that he 
be authorised to express to both the King and the Junta leaders the us government’s “strong hope 
questions of government in greece can be resolved without bloodshed”, noting them that “warfare 
in this part of world can redound to benefit only of communists” (which was quite a different 
intervention than the one constantine had hoped for); he further added that he did not plan to 
have King’s statement broadcast from us facilities until it was at least clear “his maneuver has 
reasonable chance of success”. in fact, constantine’s statement was never broadcast on Voa; see 
Telegram from the embassy in greece to the mission to the north atlantic Treaty organisation, 
athens, 13 december 1967, 0915Z, FRUS, 1964-1968, document 344; Telegram from the embassy 
in greece to the department of state, athens, 13 december 1967, 1647Z, ibid., document 346.
“They shook hands Very Warmly”: 
Front page of the athenian newspaper 
Το Βήμα, on the Johnson-constantine 
meeting (12 september 1967)
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every order issued from above would 
be immediately executed, without 
having to fire a single shot, proved 
to be rather naive, since the younger 
pro-Junta officers reacted quickly by 
arresting several royalist generals and 
taking control of their units, while the 
rest of the undecided high-ranking 
officers either remained passive or 
quickly changed sides.81 less than 24 
hours later, realising that his coup 
had failed, constantine fled to italy 
along with his family,82 thus putting a 
de facto end to his reign, a status that 
would become de jure in 1974.83
The question remains as to 
what the King actually believed about the us position vis-à-vis his intention to 
confront the colonels. as mentioned above, in his confidences to Talbot in may, 
81 during that day Kay Bracken, the chief political counsellor in us embassy, “was full of 
disdain for the impetuosity and stupidity of the young King”, according to her subordinate 
robert Keeley, who notes for his part: “i carried no royalist banner myself, but i argued with 
her that we had to offer him what support we could, that he simply had to succeed, otherwise 
we would be stuck with papadopoulos for the indefinite future”; see robert V. Keeley, The 
Colonels’ Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat’s View of the Breakdown of Democracy 
in Cold War Greece, university park: pennsylvania state university press, 2010, p. 154.
82 For various accounts of the royal countercoup, see FRUS, 1964-1968, documents 343-350; 
Woodhouse, Rise and Fall, pp. 43-48; charalambis, Στρατός, pp. 247-256; papagos, Σημειώσεις, 
pp. 41-56; malouchos, Βασιλεύς Κωνσταντίνος, vol. 3, pp. 12-53; papandreou, Nightmare in 
Athens, pp. 347-354; peter murtagh, The Rape of Greece: The King, the Colonels and the Resistance, 
london: simon & schuster, 1994, pp. 152-161; Keeley, Colonels’ Coup, pp. 146-160; laurence 
stern, The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy, new 
York: Times Books, 1977, 1977, pp. 52-57; solon n. grigoriadis, Ιστορία της Συγχρόνου Ελλάδος: 
Η Δικτατορία [history of contemporary greece: the dictatorship], vol. 5, athens: Kapopoulos, 
1975, pp. 171-219; Konstantinos Kollias, Βασιλεύς και Επανάστασις 1967 [King and revolution, 
1967], athens, 1984, pp. 83-107; ioannis Kakolyris, Λύκοι στις φωλιές των αετών [Wolves 
in the eagles’ nests], athens: lotos, 1997, passim; christos lymperis, Πορεία σε ταραγμένες 
θάλασσες [course in troubled seas], athens: piotita, 2005, pp. 97-103; antonis Kakaras, Οι 
Έλληνες Στρατιωτικοί [The greek military], athens: papazissi, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 23-94; alexandra 
stefanopoulou, 13 Δεκεμβρίου 1967 [13 december 1967], athens: Fereniki, 2009, passim.
83 after the downfall of the military regime, a referendum was held on 8 december 1974, 
resulting to the definitive abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic.
“King constantine attempts to overthrow 
the military Junta”: Front page of montreal 
newspaper Le Devoir (14 december 1967)
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he had made it quite clear that he considered the success of his plan depended 
“very substantially” on us reaction.84 in July he stated that his intention was 
not to precipitate action unless the us government “approved of his purposes”, 
adding that, if it should become necessary for him to move, he would advise 
the american government in advance.85 during his visit to the White house in 
september, as we have already seen, he finally reduced his request for support 
to a simple us statement in favour of his efforts to return the country to 
constitutional rule, receiving the vague answer that such a declaration would 
be considered in the light of the circumstances at the time; he didn’t even get 
a straight answer on the use of Voice of america to broadcast his message to 
the greek people.86 on the contrary, as we know, his interlocutors’ intention 
was to discourage him from “pushing the regime to the point of provoking a 
confrontation”, since the us did “not want to see armed conflict in greece”, 
84 letter from the ambassador to greece, 26 may 1967.
85 Telegram from the embassy in greece, 7 august 1967.
86 memorandum of meeting between president Johnson and King constantine, 11 
september 1967.
constantine and his entourage arrive in italy 
after the failure of his counter-coup (upi cable photo, 14 december 1967)
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although there is no clear evidence that its position was spelled out to him in 
so many words.87 in any case, the general picture seemed rather negative. one 
wonders if constantine understood it but decided to move anyway, hoping that 
an eventual success would reverse the tide, or if, instead, he was deliberately 
led into a fatal trap, through dubious double talk; or, thirdly, if he completely 
misinterpreted Johnson’s southern charm and the diplomatically expressed 
concerns about his plans.88 in any case, as in previous crucial conjunctures of 
his reign, he manifested once again a spiritual shallowness, accompanied by 
striking lack of political judgment. 
one must not overlook though that, as robert Keeley, political officer in 
the us embassy, put it, “it was perhaps tragic but indeed a fact that after april 
21 we had placed all our eggs in the King’s basket. We had counted on him to 
exercise a moderating influence on the Junta, and we had furthermore counted 
on him to rescue us by throwing the Junta out if things went really sour.”89 
according to another diplomatic source, up to the moment of the countercoup, 
the americans had been telling the King, “Your majesty, you are the only 
person who can pull this together. You have the full good wishes and support 
of the united states.” But the King, unfortunately, interpreted the word support 
in a different way that it was intended.90 afterward, the King would tell an 
american confidant: 
The impression i had was that not only would your country be in 
my corner but that you would have planes and ships off-shore – that 
you would make it clear the united states was hoping for a return to 
democracy and would broadcast the tape i gave to the ambassador. 
87 Though these phrases are included in the document prepared by dean rusk before the 
meeting, they do not appear in the above-mentioned memorandum of the actual meeting.
88 in the conversation he held in 8 July 1971 with the american ambassador henry 
Tasca, on passing through rome, constantine insisted that president Johnson “told him 
that he could count on his moral support if he moved against the junta”; see telegram from 
the embassy in greece to the department of state, athens, 11 July 1971, 0855Z, FRUS 
1969-1972, document 319; This is how papagos describes constantine’s remark: “Johnson 
then [in 1967] urged the King, with pressure and persuasiveness, to bring the country back 
to legitimacy. The King replied that he was trying to and would continue trying to, but 
asked for the moral support of the president. ‘You have it’, Johnson told him”; see papagos, 
Σημειώσεις, pp. 360-363.
89 Keeley, Colonels’ Coup, p. 154; cf. margaret papandreou’s remark on 20 august: “our 
fate is that the King may have to become the champion of democratic rule. But he is so inept, 
and so weak, and makes so many mistakes – that one cannot be sure he will decide on a line 
and carry it through”; see papandreou, Nightmare in Athens, p. 298.
90 stern, Wrong Horse, p. 55.
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Beyond that, i assumed there were other ways you could exert 
influence without being identified. From your ambassador i got the 
impression that the united states would not remain indifferent, that 
there would be a showing of american interest.91
Two years later, in april 1969, while Brigadier pattakos was officially received 
by the new american president, richard nixon, in Washington, the self-exiled 
King contented himself with a brief meeting with the new secretary of state. 
William rogers explained to his guest that, although the us government “had a 
basic interest in political evolution and constitutional development in greece”, at 
the same time it “did not want to see greece weakened militarily as a naTo ally”, 
noting that it is “our policy not to intervene in domestic matters”. according 
to the official memorandum of that conversation, constantine replied that he 
now understood the american policy and “if this had been made clear to him 
when he was in Washington in september 1967, he might not have undertaken 
his action of 13 december and would have instead stayed in greece to continue 
influencing the government”.92 his admission probably answers our question 
as to whether he understood the us government’s position concerning his 
intention to confront the Junta. 
Institute of Historical Research / NHRF
91 ibid., p. 56.
92 memorandum of conversation, Washington, 2 april 1969, FRUS 1969-1972, document 
244. present at that meeting, besides King constantine and us secretary of state William 
rogers, were deputy assistant secretary for near eastern affairs stuart rockwell, country 
director for greece daniel Brewster and grand marshal leonidas papagos. The latter, in his 
lengthy reference to the above conversation, recounts the King’s specific remark as follows: 
“if they had talked to him this way in america, when he visited Johnson in 1967, he would 
not have tried to get rid of the Junta”; see papagos, Σημειώσεις, pp. 164-167. 
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